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Abstract 
This study analyses the influence of the party reforms of 2012 and the ‘counter-reforms’ of 
2013-14 on the Russian party system, and the structure of political and electoral cleavages in 
Russian regions. The emergence of new political parties in 2012-13 led to a temporary increase 
in electoral competition, an augmentation of the political space and a rise in the number of 
electoral cleavages, but these developments did not weaken the domination of United Russia. 
The trend towards an ever greater tightening up of entry requirements for contestation in the 
elections led to a lowering of the number of political and, consequently, electoral cleavages, in 
addition to a reformatting of the political space. The study shows that there was an unbalancing 
of the political cleavage structure in 2012-15: the socioeconomic political cleavage, whose 
primary place is a key determinant of equilibrium, ceded the top position to the authoritarian-
democratic cleavage in 2012-13, and to the “Ukrainian” (systemic) cleavage in 2014-15.  
Key Words: cleavage structure, Russian regional elections, political and electoral 
cleavages, party reform in Russia  
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The party and electoral reforms of 2012 and the counter-reforms of 2013-14 have had a major 
influence on elections to regional legislatures in Russia. The adoption of new rules governing 
the registration of parties, and the emergence of scores of new parties, not only intensified the 
levels of political competition but also changed the structure of the political and electoral 
cleavages in the regions.  
The aim of this paper is to analyse how changes in the number of parties competing in 
regional elections have affected the cleavage structure at the regional level. Since 2004 Russian 
regional legislatures have been elected by a mixed electoral system (combining party list PR 
elections with single mandate races). As party membership has not been an important factor in 
the single member races (Golosov 2004), we focus on the party list contests in four rounds of 
regional assembly elections conducted over the period 2012-15. The first section analyses 
changes to electoral and party legislation, the second examines the party makeup of regional 
legislatures and the third provides a detailed account of changes in the cleavage structure. 
1. Changes to Party and Electoral Legislation 
In the wake of the mass demonstrations which emerged in protest against the results of the 
elections to the State Duma in 2011, radical changes to electoral and party registration laws 
were adopted in spring 2012 which made it much easier for parties to register and participate 
in elections (see Ross, 2014). According to these amendments the number of party members 
required for registration was drastically reduced from 40,000 to 500!1 As a result of this new 
legislation, the total number of parties rose sharply from 7 in December 2011 to 78 by 
September 2015. Here it would appear that there was a move from one extreme (too few 
parties) to another (too many parties) and that this was a deliberate strategy of the Kremlin to 
                                                          
1 Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 28, 2 April 2012.  
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keep the opposition weak and fragmented. In addition, changes to the rules governing 
registering for elections stipulated that party list candidates no longer needed to submit 
nomination signatures, and the maximum number of signatures required by independent 
candidates was lowered from 2% to 0.5%.2 In previous elections scores of opposition 
candidates and party lists were denied registration because the regional electoral commissions 
declared their nomination signatures invalid (see Ross 2011 and 2011a). The new election rules 
now made it much easier for parties to register for elections. 
The Counter-Reform of 2013-4 
Unfortunately, these reforms did not last long as the mass protest movement lost momentum 
and gradually fizzled out, and the Putin regime began to feel more secure. In 2013 and 2014 a 
series of amendments were quickly pushed through the Duma which has led to a re-tightening 
of the Kremlin’s reigns over the election process and the abolition of many of the reforms 
adopted in 2012. These new laws changed the situation so drastically that scholars of Russian 
politics refer to them as “party counter-reforms” (Borisov, Korgunyuk, Lyubarev, and 
Mikhaleva 2015).3 
          In May 2014 the requirement of party list candidates to collect nomination signatures 
was reinstated, although the percentage of signatures required was lowered from 2% to 0.5% 
of the regional electorate. In sharp contrast, for candidates in the single mandate elections, the 
number of required signatures was raised from 0.5 to 3%.4 Whilst these electoral thresholds are 
                                                          
2 Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 41, 2 May 2012. 
3 Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 95, 5 May 2014, ‘О vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nyi zakon, 
“Ob osnovnykh grantiyakh izbiratel’nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referndume grazhdan RF.”’   
4 Ibid. 
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not particularly high, the reintroduction of nomination signatures gave the electoral 
commissions the opportunity to deny opposition parties entry to the elections. Candidates have 
been denied registration in the past, because they wrote the date or signed their name in the 
wrong place on their nomination forms, or because they used the wrong colour of pen or 
because of other trivial mistakes made by the collectors of the signatures (Ross, 2011, 648).  
Moreover, there was no level playing field in the nomination process. Parties which 
held seats or received 3% of the votes in elections to the State Duma, were exempt from 
gathering signatures. This meant that the four Duma parliamentary parties; United Russia 
(Edinaya Rossiya, UR), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Kommunisticheskaya 
Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsiya, CPRF), The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Liberal’no 
Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii, LDPR), and Just Russia (Spravedlivaya Rossiya, JR) 
qualified for the regional elections by default, as did Yabloko (Rossiiskaya Ob’edinennaya 
Demokraticheskaya Partiya YABLOKO), which won 3.4% of the votes in the Duma elections 
of 2011.5 A total of 28.2% of candidates were denied registration in the 2014 elections (Kynev, 
Lyubarev and Maximov 2015, p.182) and 20.7% in 2015 (Kynev, Lyubarev and Maximov 
2015a, pp. 18-19) However, for those parties which did not need to submit nomination 
signatures, the corresponding figures were much smaller, just 3.9% and 2.1% respectively, 
whilst for those parties which had to collect signatures, the numbers denied registration were 
much higher, comprising 74.2% in 2014 (Kynev, Lyubarev and Maximov 2015, p. 182) and 
89.4% in 2015 (Kynev, Lyubarev and Maximov 2015a, pp. 18-19) 
                                                          
5 Parties which hold seats in, or win 3% of the votes in regional assemblies, or 0.5% of the total 
number of seats in a region’s municipal councils, are also exempt from submitting signatures in those 
particular regions, and this allowed a number of other opposition parties (such as, Patriots of Russia 
and Just Cause), to compete in a few regions without submitting signatures. 
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Of the 7 registered parties which competed in elections to the State Duma in December 
2011, four were successful in gaining representation; the “ruling” UR party, the CPRF, the 
LDPR and JR. The latter three parties will hereafter be referred to as the “parliamentary 
opposition”. Three other parties – Yabloko, Patriots of Russia (Patrioty Rossii PR), and Right 
Cause (Pravoe Delo RC) which did not have seats in the parliament in 2011 – may be labelled 
the “old non-parliamentary parties”. The pro-forma, Republican Party of Russia – People’s 
Freedom Party (Respublikanskaya Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii-Partiya Narodnoi Svobody 
RPR-PARNAS), should also be attributed to this category as it was first registered in 2002 (it 
lost its registration in 2007 and won it back again in 2012). 
2. Changes in the levels of party contestation and party saturation of regional legislatures 
47 regional legislatures were elected over the period 2012-15: 6 in 2012, 16 in 2013, 14 in 
2014, and 11 in 2015.6  An analysis of these campaigns and their results can help us uncover 
important trends in the development of the Russian party system. The main data characterising 
the 2012-15 elections are represented in Table 1.7 
                                                          
6 Legislation adopted in November 2013 lowered the minimum percentage of members of regional 
legislatures that were required to be elected on the basis of proportional representation from 50% to 
25% and the requirement to use the PR system was lifted completely for elections to the Moscow City 
Duma and the St. Petersburg City Council.  
7 The level of inter-party competition in elections to regional legislatures was measured with the help 
of the following indicators: 1. For elections: the number of nominated and registered party lists in each 
region; the share of votes received by the largest party; the effective number of electoral parties (ENPE) 
for each region (in all regions as a whole – a range and an average value). ENPE was calculated by the 
Laakso–Taagepera formula N2 =
1
∑ pi
2n
i=1
= (∑ pi
2n
i=1 )
-1
 where рi is the share of the total number of valid 
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    [Table 1 about here] 
Nomination and Registration of Parties 
As can be seen in Table 1, 23 parties had the right to participate in the 2012 regional elections. 
The number of those who nominated party lists, varied from 11 in Penza and Sakhalin oblasts 
to 18 in North Ossetia. By 2013 the number of parties seeking participation in the elections had 
risen to 47 and the number of party lists ranged from 10 to 23.  In 2014, despite the increasing 
number of parties, their electoral activity fell steeply. Under the new stricter registration 
procedures, just 39 of the 69 parties nominated their lists, and their level of participation varied 
from 7 to 15. In 2015, 36 parties nominated party lists (Regional’nye vybory… 2015, p. 18), 
and the number of party lists varied from 9 to 18. 
         Turning to the registration of party lists, the liberalisation of registration rules in 2012 led 
to a rise in the average number of party lists in each region from 13.2 in 2012 to 17.2 in 2013. 
However, as a result of the reinstatement of the requirement to gather nomination signatures, 
the average number of registered parties fell to 9.3 in 2014 and 7.7 in 2015 (see Table 1).  
Voting for United Russia and the Opposition 
                                                          
votes received by a party (Laakso, Taagepera 1979). However, the Laakso and Taagepera’s ENP has 
some disadvantages, particularly for the measurement of dominant party systems (such as Russia), as 
their method overemphasises the weight of minor parties.  In order to eliminate this problem, we have 
also calculated the values of ENP using an alternative formula ENPE proposed by Golosov (2010): 𝑁𝑝 =
∑
𝑆𝑖
𝑆𝑖+𝑆1
2−𝑆𝑖
2
𝑥
1 . where x is a total number of parties in the system, Si – the share of votes received by a 
party, S1 – the share of the party winning first place at the election (see Table 3).  
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As can be seen in Table 2, UR won a majority of the party list votes in 33 of the 46 regional 
elections, and over two thirds of the votes in 16 regions (see Table 2). The CPRF came second 
to UR in 28 regions and it was pushed into third place by the LDPR in 8 assemblies. The 
CPRF’s highest share of votes was 25.7% (in Novosibirsk Oblast in 2015). LDPR came third 
in 28 regions and fourth in 18. Its highest level of support was 17.2% (in the Republic of 
Khakasiya in 2013). JR came third in 18 regions and fourth in 28, with its greatest success 
coming in the Republic of Sakha, in 2013 where it picked up 16.6% of the votes (see Table 2). 
[Table 2 about here] 
Levels of Contestation: effective number of electoral parties 
The highest ENPE scores according to the Laaskso-Taagepera formula were to be found in 
Arkhangelsk, Yaroslavl and Smolensk oblasts in 2013 (4.27, 4.27 and 4.22 respectively), whilst 
the lowest ENPE was found in Kemerovo Oblast  (1.31 in 2013). A total of 13 regions had a 
score of less than 2. According to the Golosov formula there were 28 regions with scores of 
less than 2. The highest was 3.32 in Arkhangelsk and the lowest, 1.16 in Kemerovo (see Table 
3). In 2014, despite the sharp increase in the number of parties, ENPE was less than 2, in 6 of 
the 13 regions (according to the Laakso-Taagepera formula), and less than 2 in 11 regions 
(according to the Golosov formula). Thus, the sharp rise in the number of registered parties did 
not raise the level of the inter-party competition. In 2015 the ENPE exceeded 3 only in 
Kostroma and Novosibirsk oblasts (according to Laakso-Taagepera) whilst in Voronezh and 
Nenets AO it did not even reach 2 (see Table 3). According to the Golosov formula, 9 of the 
11 regions had an ENPE of less than two. 
[Table of 4 about here] 
Party representation in regional legislatures 
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Over the period 2012-15 the total number of parties represented in regional assemblies rose 
sharply from an average of 5 in 2012 to 14 in 2013 before falling back to 8 in 2014 and 5 in 
2015 (see Table 1). As can be seen in Table 4, UR won a total average of 371 seats (81.3%). 
Moreover it won over 90% of the seats in half of the regional assemblies, and more than two 
thirds in all the other regions (with the exception of North Ossetia).8 The CPRF was second 
with a total average of 39 seats (8.5%), JR was third with 24 (4.3%) and the LDPR came last 
with 20 (5.2%).The 2015 elections led to the formation of non-competitive legislatures with 
poor representation of the opposition. In these elections UR won a total of 371 of the 456 seats 
(81.3%). The success rate of the other parliamentary parties was very modest. The CPRF won 
a total of just 39 seats (8.5%), more than half of them in Novosibirsk oblast. The LDPR won 
just 20 seats (4.3%) and Just Russia – 24 (5.2%), (see Table 4).  
        To sum up, the radical changes to party and electoral legislation in 2012 opened a 
"window of opportunity" for opposition parties to participate more fully in regional elections 
but throughout the period UR dominated all of the assemblies. Opposition parties were most 
successful in gaining entry to the elections in 2013 when the legislation governing the 
nomination and registration of candidates and party lists was most relaxed, and the level of 
electoral competition was relatively high. However, as demonstrated above, in 2014 the 
"window of opportunity" began to close and this trend continued in 2015, leading to a reduction 
in the number of party lists contesting the elections and a drop in the success rate of the 
parliamentary opposition parties.  
                                                          
8 Legislation adopted in May 2014 (see footnote 3) reduced the electoral threshold for the party list 
elections from 7 to 5% thus making it easier for some opposition parties to gain seats in some regional 
assemblies. 
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3. Identifying cleavages and changes in the cleavage structure. 
Methodology of Research on Cleavages 
The cleavage structure, which can be understood as interdependence between the social status 
of voters and their political preferences, constitutes the foundations of any party system. When 
Lipset and Rokkan in their path-breaking study (1967) formulated their cleavage theory, they 
kept in mind the evident differences in voting for parties with opposing ideologies in various 
territorial units.  
         As a rule, Lipset-Rokkan followers have dealt only with the most apparent cleavages 
dominating in the political space. But the cleavage structure of any society will also contain 
less visible cleavages. This problem is especially acute for countries with fluid and unstable 
party systems where every election produces new political actors. In such cases factor analysis 
comes to the rescue. Slider, Gimpelson and Chugrov (1994) used this method for detecting 
electoral cleavages9 in the Russian Duma election of 1993, Zarycki (1999, 2002) and Zarycki 
and Nowak (2000) employed it for parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland. But the 
conclusions of these studies have been brought into question due to the difficulties they 
encountered when they tried to work out the political and social explanators for the “electoral 
cleavages.”  
It was relatively easy to find the socio-demographic background of electoral cleavages. 
Slider et al. (1994), Zarycki (1999, 2002) and Zarycki and Nowak (2000) compared factor 
                                                          
9 By the term 'electoral cleavage' we understand the differentiation of electoral preferences empirically 
fixed at every single election. In order to be recognized as a ‘full’ cleavage according to Bartolini and 
Mair’s interpretation (1990), an electoral cleavage must be repeated several times; also, its close links 
to certain political parties and the political values of significant groups of voters must be demonstrated. 
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scores of electoral cleavages with the social, demographic and economic indicators for every 
region using correlation analysis. Akhremenko (2007) also applied linear regression analysis. 
Korgunyuk (2014 and 2015) developed a new approach which entails subjecting the entire set 
of demographic and socioeconomic indicators to factor analysis which provides a complete 
picture of social stratification in a society; scores for the stratifying factors are then compared 
further with electoral cleavages through linear regression analysis. 
However, it is much more difficult to interpret electoral cleavages politically in those 
countries where the number of contestants is high and volatile. This problem does not exist in 
the party systems of Western countries which generally have a smaller number of participants. 
As a rule, the picture of political contestation here, is clear and understandable. Where the 
electoral system is fluid and there is a high turnover of parties in each election cycle, it makes 
more sense to compare the electoral cleavage structure with political cleavages. 
   The study of ‘political cleavages’ is well-developed and the use of factor analysis is 
common practice. (Evans & Whitefield, 1998; Moreno, 1999; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Whitefield, 
2002; König, Marbach, and Osnabrügge, 2013; Dalton and McAllister, 2015). However, a key 
problem with the existing studies, is the fact that they have to rely on public opinion polls and 
expert surveys for their data. Such an approach has its drawbacks. As Stoll points out, factor 
analysis of public or political elite opinion data usually relies ‘upon the analyst selecting a 
relevant set of issues for consideration’ (Stoll, 2004, p. 45). As a result, researches not only 
study the issues but also help to form the final picture.  
 Moreover, the political preferences of voters often do not exist in a prepared form. They are 
created in dialogue between the electorate and political actors during electoral campaigns. 
Thus, what political actors express is a product of the joint work of the politicians and the 
voters. Therefore, if the task is to understand why citizens vote for certain parties, it is necessary 
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to study all of the electoral campaign materials, rather than the opinions of experts, or just party 
programmes. This method helps us to highlight issues raised by political actors that are of 
interest to voters and that excite the liveliest discussion among contestants.  
The next step is to identify the position of every contestant on every issue using a scale from 
–5 to +5. The range of issues examined in this study varied from ideological to situational. The 
main criteria employed in selecting the sample were; (1) the issues were discussed by the most 
active actors and (2) the presence of extreme positions – from total support (+5) to complete 
denial (-5); point ‘zero’ corresponds either to a centrist position or to a complete absence of the 
position. While formulating issues, preference was given to the original statements of parties 
and their representatives. While identifying the position of every contestant on every issue, 
only statements of parties and their representatives were taken into account (we do not include 
expert assessments). In the cases of inner-party dissent, the score takes into account the political 
‘weight’ of the ‘speakers’. 
Examples of our estimates of party positions can be seen in the table 5.10 The subject of the 
sample issue is ‘attitudes to President Putin’. We can see that almost all parties have a clear-
cut position here: most of them fully supported the president (their score is +5), only the liberal 
parties, Yabloko and PARNAS strongly condemn Putin’s policies in all spheres (thus they 
receive -5). The Communist Party of the Russian Federation supports the foreign policy of 
Putin but condemns the socioeconomic course of his government; so it receives a score of zero. 
A party functionary of the party, ‘Communist Party of Russia: Communists of Russia’ 
(Kommunisticheskaya Partiya. Kommunisty Rossii) called Putin ‘the President of capitalists 
                                                          
10 This is a reduced form of the original table employed in the study, which is presented here only as 
an illustration of the method employed. 
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and oligarchs’, but, unlike Ziuganov and other CPRF leaders, he stated this just once, and no 
one else in the party dared to repeat this again; thus the party’s position was assessed as -1. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The scores of parties on every issue are then subjected to factor analysis. The factors 
discovered in this process can be considered as ‘political cleavages’. Their factor loadings must 
be compared with those of electoral cleavages by correlation analysis. If the correlation is 
significant (R ≥ 0.5) it means that the electoral cleavage has political content. 
      The methodology described above allows us to capture variations in the type and strength 
of cleavages even in highly unstable and volatile party systems, such as Russia. We stress the 
political dimension of cleavage formation. Parties not only reflect social divisions they also 
play a key role in their manufacture. In contrast to the sociological approach of Lipset and 
Rokkan which sees party systems primarily as expressions of different social divisions we 
prefer the approach of Mainwaring and Torcal who argue that whilst, there is, a complex 
interaction between political factors and the social context, it is politics which is primarily 
‘responsible for creating, transforming, deepening or diffusing specific social and economic 
conflicts’ (2000, p. 5). 
    Our methodological approach allows us to evaluate the level of political competition for 
each region which participated in the 2012-15 rounds of regional elections. A higher number 
of political and electoral cleavages and the possibility to interpret electoral cleavages politically 
and socially indicates, if not the presence of higher levels of competition, then an easing of the 
administrative pressure on voters. On the other hand, a smaller number of cleavages and the 
absence of links between electoral and political cleavages, as well as between electoral 
cleavages and stratification factors, indicates lower levels of competition. If the primary 
13 
 
electoral cleavages have no predictors among the stratification factors, this would suggest the 
presence of electoral fraud. 
The electoral data for subsequent sections were taken from the official website of the 
Central Election Commission (http://www.cikrf.ru); demographic and socioeconomic data 
from the website of the Federal State Statistics Service (http://www.gks.ru) as well as from the 
Database of Municipal Indicators of the Federal State Statistics Service 
(http://www.gks.ru/dbscripts/munst). The campaign materials (party programmes, leaflets, 
speeches and interviews of party leaders and activists, etc.) were compiled from the 
PartArchive Database (http://www.indem.ru/pa98). Several thousand documents (party 
programmes, leaflets, interviews, etc.) were analysed for each election campaign. For example, 
about 5000 documents were examined for the 2015 regional campaigns. 
Variations in the structure of political cleavages 
What political cleavages are present in post-communist Russia? For all Duma elections from 
1993 to 2011 there were just three such cleavages, regardless of the number of participants: (1) 
socio-economic, (2) authoritarian–democratic and (3) systemic (Korgunyuk, 2014). The first, 
which is also known as the left-right cleavage, is familiar to all scholars who study cleavages. 
The authoritarian–democratic cleavage is no longer applicable to Western democracies, but 
this is not the case for some of the post-communist countries of Central and Easter Europe, and 
some countries in Latin America (Moreno, 1999; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002; Stoll, 2004, p. 
44). 
The third cleavage, the systemic political cleavage, appears, as a rule, only in those 
countries undergoing transition. In the 1990s, such a dimension existed in the political space 
of post-communist polities of Eastern and Central Europe (it reflected the attitude of citizens 
to the political and economic reforms) and in some countries of Latin America - the so-called 
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liberal–fundamentalist dimension (Kitschelt, 1995; Moreno, 1999; Stoll, 2004, p. 44; 
Clemente, 2009). In Russia, the systemic political cleavage comprises issues from the socio-
economic and authoritarian–democratic agendas and it is considered to be a sound indicator of 
the general direction of the country’s political development. 
    This threefold structure of political cleavages looks quite “archaic” from a western 
perspective. The authoritarian–democratic cleavage lost its salience in Western Europe after 
World War II, and for Eastern and Central Europe – at the beginning of the 2000s. As for the 
systemic cleavage, it is specific, as a rule, for transitioning societies and its presence indicates 
a high level of political polarization - the main actors do not gravitate towards the centre but 
repel each other, and by this method they “stretch” the political space.  
    Changes in the balance of power between opposite political forces can make the system quite 
unstable. Nevertheless, the structure of political cleavages and their hierarchy has been 
relatively stable for the Duma elections (1993-2011): the socio-economic cleavage almost 
always came first, the systemic – second, and the authoritarian–democratic – third (the only 
exception was the 1993-election, where the position of the socio-economic cleavage and the 
systemic factor was reversed: the latter had a higher eigenvalue that the former). But the 
cleavage structure underwent a change in the 2012-15 round of regional elections. The party 
reforms of 2012 led to a sharp increase in the number of parties which have the right to 
participate in elections. As a result, in 2012-13 the number of 'political cleavages' rose above 
three in many regions. The reason was that many new parties were spoiler or niche projects 
and did not take part in the national political discussion, so their positions on most issues could 
be evaluated only with a mark of ‘zero.’ 
    If we limit the number of contestants to only those parties which took an active part in 
national political debates, the political space acquires a three-dimensional form again, but the 
15 
 
hierarchy of the political cleavages changes: for elections to regional legislatures in 2012–13, 
the authoritarian–democratic cleavage came first (United Russia versus all other participants), 
the socio-economic cleavage second, and the systemic third. This shift can be explained if we 
take into consideration the fact that a prominent issue which rose to the surface in 2012-13 was 
related to Putin’s crackdown on the non-systemic opposition movement, and his assault on 
civil society. Not surprisingly, therefore the authoritarian–democratic cleavage acquired a 
leading position (Korgunyuk, 2015). 
    The political space changed even more radically in 2014. The crisis in Ukraine posited a 
systemic political cleavage – between imperialists (the overwhelming majority of the Russian 
parties) and anti-imperialists (exclusively liberals). The imperialists welcomed the 
‘repatriation’ of Crimea and they referred to the Ukrainian authorities, as a ‘junta’, and 
‘fascists’. On the contrary, the anti-imperialists condemned the ‘annexation’ of Crimea and 
insisted that Russia was waging an undeclared war against Ukraine. This cleavage reflected 
most clearly the confrontation between the Westerners and “Samobytniki” (people who 
advocate a non-Western path of Russia’s development). The authoritarian–democratic and 
socio-economic cleavages were pushed into second and third places (Korgunyuk, 2015). 
In 2015, the factor analysis of the issue positions of seven parties (UR, LDPR, CPRF, 
JR, Yabloko, PR, RPR-PARNAS) revealed only two political cleavages. The first was 
“imperialistic” (systemic). The greatest confrontation was generated by the “Ukrainian” issues 
but there were also debates over abolishing the so-called “state corporations” and repealing the 
law on “NGOs-Foreign Agents”: the liberal leading parties, Yabloko and PARNAS parties 
were pro, all the others – contra (Table 6). Thus, the systemic cleavage went beyond the foreign 
policy agenda and included domestic-political and socio-economic agendas. As for the second 
political cleavage, it can be interpreted as “authority vs opposition”. The political issues 
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("Attitudes to municipal reforms", "Cancelling the municipal filter in gubernatorial elections") 
were mixed up with socioeconomic factors ("The government’s anti-crisis plan is ineffective", 
"Real social budget expenditures are being reduced"), (Table 7). 
[Tables 6 and 7 about here] 
In addition to the seven parties noted above, there were 8 additional parties which received 
more than 1% of the votes in the PR system in September 13, 2015. If we add these parties to 
our analysis, a third political cleavage can be detected which may be characterized as 
socioeconomic, or, more precisely, as a hybrid of the socioeconomic and the authoritarian-
democratic cleavages.  
The main participators of this divide were the CPRF and Communists of Russia, on the 
one hand, and Civic Platform, Right Cause and the Green Party, on the other (Chart 1). The 
main areas of contestation were the “nationalisation of essential industries”, “cancelling the 
Universal State Examination”, “state regulation of prices”, on the one hand, and “support for 
Putin”, “attitudes towards the municipal reforms”, on the other. But this three-dimensionality 
owes its existence to the large number of 'zeros' in the positions of Civic Platform, Right Cause 
and the Green Party which acted as spoiler projects. Moreover, there were no regions where all 
15 parties participated in the same elections together, so the existence of this cleavage is purely 
hypothetical. 
    Overall, we can state that over the period 2012-15 the structure of political cleavages moved 
out of balance, and this imbalance grew especially fast in 2014-15. Over the period 1995-2011, 
the hierarchy of political cleavages remained stable: the socioeconomic cleavage held first 
place, the systemic one – came second, the authoritarian–democratic – third. In 2012, the 
relatively “archaic” authoritarian–democratic cleavage pushed the socioeconomic cleavage 
into second place. Then, in 2014, the “Ukrainian” cleavage (systemic in its essence) came to 
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the fore – its emergence was a consequence of the acute polarization which emerged around 
the Crimea-Ukrainian issues, where there was no middle position – only full support for Putin 
or strong condemnation Putin and his policies. 
    Finally, in 2015 the number of political cleavages was reduced to two. But these were not 
the cleavages found in advanced industrial countries (economic left–right and materialism–
post-materialism – see Moreno, 1999). The first, “Ukrainian”, cleavage was of a systemic 
nature, whilst the second had an authoritarian–democratic character and absorbed completely 
the socioeconomic cleavage. This structure of political cleavages can be considered highly 
abnormal, and peculiar to crisis situations. 
The number and types of political cleavages in the regions 
In 2012 there were four political cleavages in five regions and three in Penza oblast. In 2013 
the number of cleavages varied from two in Kemerovo oblast and Khakassia, to five in Ivanovo, 
Irkutsk and Yaroslavl oblasts (see tables 7 and 8). After the Kremlin's return to the 
‘optimization’ of electoral participation in 2014 (that is, the forced withdrawal from the 
elections of some opposition candidates), the number of ‘political cleavages’ decreased 
sharply. There were three cleavages in four regions and only two in nine others. Finally, there 
were only two political cleavages everywhere in 2015 (see tables 9 and 10). In Magadan oblast, 
where only six parties participated in the election, the requirement to exclude all factors with 
the eigenvalue <0 left a single cleavage; but by reducing the cut-off to 0.98 allowed a second 
cleavage to emerge. 
In 2012-13, the primary political cleavage was authoritarian-democratic in all regions. 
More precisely, not so much authoritarian-democratic as ‘authority vs opposition’. 
Authoritarian-democratic issues (“attitudes to the party reforms”, “cancelling the municipal 
filter in the gubernatorial elections”) were mixed with socioeconomic (“freezing of housing 
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and utility tariffs”, “return to a progressive income tax”). In 2013 some issues from the systemic 
“kit” were wedged into this cleavage: “the right of citizens to carry handguns”, “constitutional 
recognition of the state-forming status of ethnic Russians”.  
As for the second political cleavage, in 2012 it had socioeconomic features in four 
regions and in two it owed its existence to “spoiler” parties (more precisely, to “zeros” in their 
positions). Features of socioeconomic cleavage were also detected in the fourth political 
cleavage in four regions. The third electoral cleavage in all six regions, with the exception of 
Sakhalin, was mostly systemic (Table 8). 
[Table 8 about here] 
In 2013, the second political cleavage had a predominantly systemic nature in all 16 
regions but with the domination of the authoritarian-democratic features in three oblasts, and 
socioeconomic in the rest of regions. 
 A systemic character was peculiar to the third cleavage in all of the regions with the 
exception of regions with only two political cleavages, and also in Bashkortostan, Rostov 
oblast, and Trans-Baikal krai (here it had no interpretation due to large number of new parties 
with many zeros in their issue positions). The fourth political cleavage was present in six 
regions, but only in Arkhangelsk oblast could it be identified as systemic, in the other five 
regions it owed its existence to the spoiler or niche parties. A similar point can also be made 
about the fifth cleavage in Ivanovo and Yaroslavl oblasts. 
In 2014-15, the primary political cleavage in all the regions was “Ukrainian”, 
“imperialistic”. The second cleavage in 2014 had a mixed nature – with a predominance of 
socioeconomic features in Crimea and Sevastopol - and authoritarian-democratic in the other 
regions. The third political cleavage was found in four regions; it had a mixed structure – with 
the predominance of authoritarian-democratic features in Crimea and socioeconomic features 
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in the remaining regions. In 2015, the second political cleavage had a mixed nature (systemic 
but not “Ukrainian”) with the prevalence of socioeconomic features in Belgorod and Voronezh 
oblasts and authoritarian-democratic in the other regions. 
    Thus, the Russian authorities have mastered the art of manipulation with a number of 
political cleavages in every single region. Depending on the aims pursued, they can either 
increase this number (if the aim was to confuse the voter) or diminish it (if the aim was to limit 
choice). In 2012-13, the aim was more often to disorientate the voter, and the appearance of 
many new parties made it impossible to comprehend the picture, not only for ordinary voters, 
but also for political scientists armed with statistical tools. 
    In 2014-15, the goal was, on the contrary, to limit the choice of the voter. “inconvenient” 
parties were not allowed to participate in the elections. Thus, we find that the cleavage structure 
in all regions acquired a minimalist character.  
Variations in the structure of electoral cleavages 
The 2012 elections  
The first effects of the party reform were felt already in the 2012 elections. The number of 
electoral cleavages with eigenvalue ≥1 increased in comparison to the Duma election of 2011 
in 3 of 6 regions: from 2 to 3 in Saratov and Sakhalin oblasts and from 3 to 5 in North Ossetia11 
(see Table 9). The reason for this were the growing number of political cleavages (which rose 
from 3 to 4 in all regions except Penza oblast) and the reduced administrative pressure on 
voters, evidenced by a drop in turnout (by 22 per cent on average). 
                                                          
11 It is important to recall that factor analysis detected in the 2011 Duma Election a single electoral 
cleavage in 4 regions, 2 cleavages in 52 regions, 3 in 26, and 4 in just one - Yekaterinburg oblast (see 
Korgunyuk, 2015). 
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[Table 9 about here] 
In all 6 regions with the exception of North Ossetia, the primary electoral cleavage was strongly 
correlated with the authoritarian-democratic political cleavage. It was a typical “authority 
against community” cleavage which has been dominant in post-Soviet Russia since the 2003 
Duma Election. In Udmurtia, North Ossetia and Penza oblast this electoral cleavage was 
conditioned by the level of urbanization (the most influential stratification factor in most 
regions12), whilst in Krasnodar krai and Saratov oblast – social factors had no influence (this 
can be interpreted as an evidence of massive electoral fraud in these regions). 
A strong socioeconomic political character was peculiar only to the second electoral 
cleavage in Udmurtiya, Krasnodar krai and Penza oblast. Here it was also socially conditioned 
(in Krasnodar krai – even by the level of urbanization).  
    The most interesting case in the 2012 elections was North Ossetia. Here the first electoral 
cleavage represented the competition between United Russia and Patriots of Russia which was 
more of a reflection of competition between regional elite groups, than between the 
“authorities” and the “community”. This electoral cleavage was socially conditioned by the 
level of urbanization – all other electoral cleavages in the region had no social background. 
Nevertheless, North Ossetia can be considered the only region where the level of electoral 
competition grew in comparison to the 2011 Duma election.13  
The 2013 elections 
                                                          
12 On the hierarchy of stratification factors, see Korgunyuk 2015, pp. 469-470. 
13 For a classification of Russian regions, depending on the level of competition, see Korgunyuk 2015, 
pp. 472-76. 
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The 2013 elections experienced the greatest effects of the party reform. The number of electoral 
cleavages varied this year from two to six.  
Everywhere, except for three regions, the first electoral cleavage had strong a 
correlation with the authoritarian-democratic political cleavage. In Arkhangelsk and Yaroslavl 
oblasts the reason for such weak correlation was, most likely, the large number of spoiler 
projects: voters perceived them as allies, not opponents of the authorities. In Khakassia, the 
first electoral cleavage reflected more of a confrontation between various local clans than rival 
political forces. 
The socioeconomic political cleavage made itself known in 10 regions: in 8 of them it 
has strong correlations with the second electoral cleavage. In Smolensk and Vladimir oblasts, 
electoral cleavages had links to the systemic political cleavage. As for the social base, the first 
electoral cleavage (“authority against community”) was socially conditioned in 15 regions, in 
12 of them – by the level of urbanization in company with other stratification factors. But in 
Rostov oblast it had no predictors which alerts us to the presence of mass ballot stuffing in 
favour of United Russia. 
In 9 of 10 cases (with the exception of Ulyanovsk oblast) electoral cleavages with 
socioeconomic political content had a social background; in three cases it was the level of 
urbanization. A significant share of electoral cleavages in Arkhangelsk (4), Vladimir (6), 
Ivanovo (4), Irkutsk (5) and Yaroslavl (4) oblasts had no political interpretation (in Yaroslaval 
oblast – none at all). This shows that the large number of new and unfamiliar parties made the 
political space non-transparent for the electorate and disoriented it. 
The 2014 elections 
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In the 2014 elections, the first effects of the “party counter-reforms” were felt. The number of 
electoral cleavages in 13 regions14 varied from one (Tatarstan) to five (Republic of Altai) 
(Table 9). 
The first electoral cleavage had a strong correlation with the authoritarian-democratic 
political cleavage everywhere with the exception of the Republic of Altai (politics in this region 
are determined mainly by patrimonial clan rivalries), Crimea and Sevastopol. In Tatarstan, 
Mari El, Karachay-Cherkessia, this electoral cleavage also had close links to the “Ukrainian” 
political cleavage, in Crimea – also with the socioeconomic ‘political cleavage. But traces of 
the socioeconomic political cleavage were found only in two cases (other than Crimea) – in the 
second electoral cleavage in Bryansk oblast and in the fourth one in the Republic of Altai. Of 
course, this political cleavage could show up only in those four regions where the three political 
cleavages took place.  
As for the social base of electoral cleavages, a regression model was built only for 10 
regions: there are no necessary socio-demographic data for Crimea and Sevastopol; as for 
Nenets AO, it includes only two municipalities which is too few for the calculation. 
The first electoral cleavage had no links to stratification factors in Karachay-
Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria (as was the case in 2011) and Bryansk oblast (unlike in 2011). 
It was conditioned by the level urbanization (often together with other stratification factors) in 
6 of 10 regions. The level of urbanization also conditioned the second electoral cleavage in 5 
regions and the third one in Volgograd oblast. But only in Bryansk oblast could this cleavage 
be interpreted as a socioeconomic political cleavage. It was a clear sign of the growing 
impoverishment of the cleavage structure.  
                                                          
14 Moscow has to be excluded from the analysis because the election to the City Duma was held 
exclusively in single-member districts. 
23 
 
The 2015 elections 
In 2015, the tendency to reduce the number of electoral cleavages continued. This time the 
highest number of electoral cleavages was three– which was the case in 4 regions. There were 
only two electoral cleavages in 6 regions, and just one – in Voronezh oblast. As before, the 
first electoral cleavage had a strong correlation with the authoritarian-democratic political 
cleavage in all the regions; in four regions it was combined with the “Ukrainian” political 
divide. Because of the absorption of the socioeconomic political cleavage by the authoritarian-
democratic cleavage (termed, “authority-oppositional”), we can find its traces in not a single 
electoral cleavage. So, the second and third electoral cleavages were deprived of any political 
content almost everywhere. 
The connection between electoral cleavages and stratification factors also declined. The 
level of urbanization conditioned electoral cleavages only in five regions – in comparison in 
2014 it had no trace only in 1 of the 10 cases analysed. None of the electoral cleavages had a 
social base in Kurgan oblast and Nenets AO. Only the third cleavage was conditioned socially 
in Magadan oblast.  
In summary, we can observe a significant simplification of the cleavage structure and 
a decline in the level of political competition in the 2015 elections. In comparison to the 2011 
Duma election, a widening of political competition can only be found in Kaluga oblast – which 
was most likely connected to the wider number of contestants. 
Conclusion 
The party reform of 2012 stimulated the emergence of new political parties and the re-
activation of the current ones. But increasing electoral competition did not shake the 
domination of United Russia in the regional legislatures. Moreover, the space of inter-party 
competition narrowed significantly in some places. In addition, the emergence of new parties 
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led to the ousting of the parliamentary opposition and independent deputies from a number of 
legislatures. 
Nevertheless, over the period 2012-13 the growth of inter-party competition, coupled 
with a slight increase in party fragmentation, led to an augmentation of the political space and 
a rise in the number of electoral cleavages. Moreover, the hierarchy of political cleavages 
changed markedly in comparison to the 2011 Duma election: the authoritarian-democratic 
cleavage (the third in 1995-2011) came first, the socioeconomic one (the first earlier) became 
the second, the systemic (the second) – was third. It was a first sign of the unbalancing of the 
political cleavage structure, if we assume that the primary place of the socioeconomic cleavage 
is a key determinant of its equilibrium. 
Lower voting for United Russia combined with the growing activity of the opposition, 
were interpreted by the Kremlin as a threat to political stability. Thus, we witnessed the party 
counter-reforms of 2013-14 which reduced the opportunities of opposition candidates, even 
those from the loyal parliamentary opposition. 
The number of parties represented in the regional legislatures fell in 2014-15 to almost 
pre-reform levels, and the presence of the opposition became symbolic in many assemblies. 
The authorities succeeded in strengthening the position of United Russia by fragmenting the 
opposition. The existing party system was conserved by creating spoiler projects which were 
designed to imitate genuine inter-party competition. 
The trend towards an ever greater tightening up of entry requirements for contestation 
in the elections led to a lowering of the number of political and, consequently, electoral 
cleavages, in addition to a reformatting of the political space. The “Ukrainian” political 
cleavage came to the fore, whilst the socioeconomic and authoritarian cleavages merged into 
one. This trend was especially evident in 2015 when the third political cleavage was not found 
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in a single region. But these developments did not lead to changes in the political essence of 
the first electoral cleavage which almost everywhere preserved its “authority” vs “opposition” 
characteristic. But the political degradation of the second and other electoral cleavages was 
clear. Whilst in 2012-13 the majority of the second cleavages and some of the third could be 
recognized as socioeconomic, only two electoral cleavages could be interpreted this way in 
2014, and none in 2015. 
This study also demonstrates that there was a marked decline in the social base of the 
electoral cleavages. The most influential stratification factor – the level of urbanization – 
conditioned the first electoral cleavage in 12 of 16 regions in 2013, but only in 3 of 12 in 2015. 
Moreover, the number of regions increased where electoral cleavages had no connection to the 
levels of social stratification. All these trends indicate a growing divergence between the 
political and electoral spaces. This can be explained by a certain inertia of the voters, but also 
by an imbalance of the political system which may be interpreted as a sign of an impending 
political crisis.  
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Table 1. Main Indicators of Elections to Regional Legislatures in 2012-15 
Indicator 
Date of elections 
October 
14th, 2012 
September 8, 
2013 
September 14, 
2014 
September 13, 
2015 
Number of parties 
having nominated party 
lists 
23 47 39 36 
Average number of 
registered party lists in a 
region 
13.2 17.2 9.3 7.8 
Average voting in favour 
of United Russia, % 
62.33 54.14 66.49 61.02 
Average ENPE (Laakso–
Taagepera formula) 
2.45 3.14 2.19 2.46 
Average ENPE (Golosov 
formula) 
1.93 2.42 1.72 1.92 
Total number of parties 
having representation in 
legislatures 
5 14 8 5 
Average share of Seats 
won by United Russia in 
a legislature, % 
83.5 78.5 85.7 81.3 
Source: Calculated by the authors from data provided by the official website of the Central 
Election Commission: http://www.cikrf.ru (last accessed 12 March 2016).  
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Table 2. Results of Party List Voting in Regional Elections, 2012–15 
Year Region Voting for parties, % 
UR CPRF LDPR JR Other 
Parties 
2012 Republic of North Ossetia 45.4 10.8 1.4 7.4 35.0 
 Republic of Udmurtia 54.7 17.7 10.4 5.2 12.0 
 Krasnodar Krai 70.8 9.2 4.7 4.2 11.1 
 Penza oblast 72.0 12.8 4.7 2.9 7.6 
 Sakhalin oblast 51.9 19.0 8.7 7.4 13.0 
 Saratov oblast 79.1 8.4 2.9 5.1 4.5 
2013 Republic of Bashkortostan 77.0 11.9 3.8 2.9 4.4 
 Republic of Buryatia 45.2 20.2 6.4 9.4 19.2 
 Republic of Kalmykia 52.4 11.6 2.7 4.6 28.7 
 Republic of Sakha 49.2 13.3 6.5 16.6 14.4 
 Republic of Khakassia 48.1 14.9 17.2 4.1 15.7 
 Chechen republic 86.1 0.2 0.1 7.3 6.3 
 Trans-Baikal Krai 44.9 14.8 13.6 10.9 15.8 
 Arkhangelsk oblast 42.6 13.5 12.9 10.9 20.1 
 Vladimir oblast 46.3 14.2 10.4 7.3 21.8 
 Ivanovo oblast  57.2 14.9 7.2 4.5 16.2 
 Irkutsk oblast 43.7 19.5 11.6 4.2 21.0 
 Kemerovo oblast 87.3 2.6 4.0 1.9 4.2 
 Rostov oblast 63.7 15.0 4.8 8.1 8.4 
 Smolensk oblast 42.5 15.6 14.0 7.9 20.0 
 Ulyanovsk oblast 59.8 14.6 7.5 3.1 15.0 
 Yaroslavl oblast 44.6 11.7 5.4 10.2 28.1 
2014* Republic of Altai 46.2 12.5 7.7 8.0 25.6 
 Republic of Kabardino-
Balkaria 
65.3 11.6 5.1 11.5 6.5 
 Republic of Karachay-
Cherkessia 
73.4 9.7 5.1 6 5.8 
 Republic of Crimea 72.8 4.7 8.8 1.9 11.8 
 Republic of Mari El 66.7 14.1 8.4 2.3 8.5 
 Republic of Tatarstan 84.9 5.6 2.4 3.7 3.4 
 Republic of Tuva 85.6 3.4 1.5 5.0 4.5 
 Khabarovsk Krai 59.2 14.6 13.8 3.8 8.6 
 Bryansk oblast 73.7 9.3 5.4 2.9 8.7 
 Volgograd oblast 62.3 14.9 8.5 5.4 8.9 
 Tula oblast 67.5 12.1 8.9 3.7 7.8 
 Sevastopol 78.0 3.8 7.5 1.9 8.8 
 Nenets AD 47.5 20.1 11.2 4.1 17.1 
2015 Komi Republic 60.4 7.7 12.1 10.4 9.4 
 Belgorod oblast 63.7 13.4 6.9 8.4 7.6 
 Chelyabinsk oblast 58.6 12.2 10.5 16.6 2.1 
 Kaluga oblast 59.8 10.3 11.0 8.1 10.8 
 Kostroma oblast 52.7 15.0 8.9 11.5 11.9 
 Kurgan oblast 58.3 13.6 14.0 11.2 2.9 
 Magadan oblast 59.9 11.9 10.3 14.1 3.8 
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 Novosibirsk oblast 46.8 25.7 10.8 11.2 5.5 
 Ryazan oblast 64.2 13.3 8.4 8.8 5.3 
 Voronezh oblast 75.4 11.1 6.2 5.6 1.7 
 Yamal-Nenets AD 71.4 6.3 13.5 6.0 2.8 
Source: Official website of the Central Election Commission: http://www.cikrf.ru (last 
accessed 12 March 2016). *Moscow City Duma in 2014 was elected fully by majoritarian votes 
in single member districts and thus is not included in this Table. 
Key: 
UR – United Russia 
CPRF Party – Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
LDPR – Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
JR – Just Russia 
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Table 3. Effective Number of Electoral Parties in Regional Elections, 2012-15 
 
Regions ENPE 
(Laakso–
Taagepera) 
ENPE 
(Golosov) 
Regions ENPE 
(Laakso–
Taagepera) 
ENPE 
(Golosov) 
2012 2014 
Republic of North 
Ossetia 
3.34 2.71 Republic of Altai 3.96  2.95 
Sakhalin oblast 3.10 2.36 Nenets AD 3.47  2.65 
Republic of 
Udmurtia 
2.88 2.18 Khabarovsk Krai 2.53  1.93 
Krasnodar Krai 1.94 1.53 Volgograd oblast 2.37  1.82 
Penza oblast 1.86 1.48 Republic of Kabardino-
Balkaria 
2.18  1.69 
Saratov oblast 1.57 1.31 Republic of Mari El 2.11  1.63 
2013 Tula oblast 2.08  1.62 
Arkhangelsk oblast 4.27  3.32 Republic of Crimea 1.85  1.48 
Yaroslavl oblast 4.27  3.18 Bryansk oblast 1.79  1.44 
Smolensk oblast 4.22  2.98 Republic of Karachay-
Cherkessia 
1.79  1.44 
Irkutsk oblast 3.94  3.09 Sevastopol 1.62  1.34 
Vladimir oblast 3.91  3.01 Republic of Tatarstan 1.38  1.20 
Trans-Baikal Krai 3.87  3.00 Republic of Tuva 1.36  1.19 
Republic of Buryatia 3.82  3.02 2015 
Republic of 
Khakassia 
3.43  2.64 Novosibirsk oblast 3.23  2.55 
Republic of Sakha 3.38  2.60 Kostroma oblast 3.13  2.18 
Republic of 
Kalmykia 
3.14  2.31 Kaluga oblast 2.56  1.94 
Ivanovo oblast 2.78  2.18 Kurgan oblast 2.56  1.94 
Ulyanovsk oblast 2.57  1.99 Komi Republic 2.51  1.90 
Rostov oblast 2.28  1.77 Chelyabinsk oblast 2.50  1.91 
Republic of 
Bashkortostan 
1.64  1.35 Magadan oblast 2.50  1.88 
Chechen republic 1.34  1.18 Belgorod oblast 2.27  1.76 
Kemerovo oblast 1.31  1.16 Ryazan oblast 2.22  1.73 
   Yamal-Nenets AD 1.85  1.49 
   Voronezh oblast 1.69  1.39 
Source: Calculated by the authors from data provided by the official website of the Central 
Election Commission: http://www.cikrf.ru (last accessed 12 March 2016). 
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Table 4. Party Composition of Regional Legislatures Elected in 2012–15 
Year Region Number of seats (%) 
UR CPRF LDPR JR Other 
Parties 
Total No of 
Seats in 
Assembly 
2012 Republic of North Ossetia 45 5 - 5 15 70 
 Republic of Udmurtia 71 11 6 1 - 89 
 Krasnodar Krai 95 5 - - - 100 
 Penza oblast 23 2 - - - 25 
 Sakhalin oblast 22 3 1 1 - 27 
 Saratov oblast 34 1 - 1 - 36 
 Total 290 
(83.5%) 
27 
(7.7%) 
10 
(3.4%) 
8 
(2.7%) 
15 347 
2013 Republic of Bashkortostan 88 10 3 - 3 104 
 Republic of Buryatia 45 8 1 6 2 62 
 Republic of Kalmykia 18 4 - - 3 25 
 Republic of Sakha 51 5 1 9 1 67 
 Republic of Khakassia 34 6 5 - 3 48 
 Chechen republic 37 - - 3 1 41 
 Trans-Baikal Krai 36 4 4 4 - 48 
 Arkhangelsk oblast 43 6 4 5 3 61 
 Vladimir oblast 32 3 2 1 - 38 
 Ivanovo oblast  22 2 1 - 1 26 
 Irkutsk oblast 29 6 4 - 4 43 
 Kemerovo oblast 44 - 1 1 - 46 
 Rostov oblast 52 6 - 2 - 60 
 Smolensk oblast 36 5 4 2 1 48 
 Ulyanovsk oblast 31 4 1 - - 36 
 Yaroslavl oblast 39 4 1 3 3 50 
 Total 549 
(78.5%) 
63 
(9.0) 
29 
(4.1) 
36 
(5.1%) 
25 699 
2014 Republic of Altai 30 3 2 2 1 38 
 Republic of Kabardino-
Balkaria 
50 8 2 8 2 70 
 Republic of Karachay-
Cherkessia 
37 5 2 3 3 50 
 Republic of Crimea 70 - 5 - - 75 
 Republic of Mari El 46 4 2 - - 52 
 Republic of Tatarstan 83 3 1 - - 87 
 Republic of Tuva 31 - - 1 - 32 
 Khabarovsk Krai 30 3 3 - - 36 
 Bryansk oblast 55 4 1 - - 60 
 Volgograd oblast 32 3 1 2 - 38 
 Tula oblast 33 2 2 - - 37 
 Moscow* 28 5 1 - 1 35 
 Sevastopol 22 - 2 - - 24 
 Nenets AD 13 3 1 - 2 19 
 Total 650 
(85.7 
43 
(6.5%) 
23 
(3.5%) 
16 
(2.4) 
9 653 
2015 Komi Republic 26 1 1 2 - 30 
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 Belgorod oblast 42 3 2 2 - 49 
 Voronezh oblast 51 3 1 1 - 56 
 Kaluga oblast 31 4 2 2 - 39 
 Kostroma oblast 28 3 1 2 1 35 
 Kurgan oblast 28 2 2 2 - 34 
 Magadan oblast 17 1 1 2 - 21 
 Novosibirsk oblast 51 16 4 4 1 76 
 Ryazan oblast 32 2 1 1 - 36 
 Chelyabinsk oblast 47 3 3 5 - 58 
 Yamal-Nenets AD 18 1 2 1 - 22 
 Total 371 
(81.3%) 
39 
(8.5%) 
20 
(4.3) 
24 
(5.2) 
2 456 
Source: Calculated with data provide by the official website of the Central Election 
Commission: http://www.cikrf.ru (last accessed 12 March 2016). *In this table we have 
included the results from Moscow City Duma which is elected fully in single mandate districts. 
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Table 5. Parties’ attitudes to Vladimir Putin 
Party Position 
Average 
rating (from -
5 to +5) 
United Russia 
S. Govorukhin, a deputy of the State Duma: "In March 2000 he 
was elected the President. And I saw that for the first time in 
decades a very educated man, with amazing diligence, with an 
extraordinary memory, replaced those uneducated, even 
illiterate, people" (15.06.15) 
5 
Communist 
party of the 
RF 
G. Ziuganov, the leader of CPRF: "The President formed the 
patriotic course in the foreign policy. This course must be 
conducted also in domestic policy. But Putin’s government 
continues in its domestic policicies to pursue an oligarchic, 
liberal course which is deadly for Russia" (20.01.15) 
0 
A Just Russia 
V. Shudegov, a deputy of the State Duma: "Today Putin is one 
of the  strongest leaders in the Globe who have done a lot for 
people and the Russian Army" (14.04.2015) 
5 
Liberal-
Democratic 
Party of 
Russia 
V. Zhirinovskii, the leader of LDPR: "He is better than El’tsin. 
He is better than Ziuganov, leader of the communists" 
(15.06.15) 
5 
Yabloko Party 
A. Mel’nikov, a member of the Bureau of the Yabloko Party: " 
He drew Russia into war with Ukraine, he disgraced the Russian 
flag with the capture of Crimea, he dishonored the Russian 
Army with these acts, he molested our citizens through vile 
propaganda " (20.06.15) 
-5 
Patriots of 
Russia 
N. Korneieva, deputy chairman of the Party: "Patriots of Russia 
will take part in the demonstration  21 February in order to 
express their support for President Putin" (20.02.15) 
5 
PARNAS 
The anti-crisis program of PARNAS: "Many years of Putin's 
rule has brought the country to a standstill. ... Putin has no 
positive programme for Russia. The development of the country 
under his leadership is impossible. So he and his team have to 
go" (13.02.15) 
-5 
Communists 
of Russia 
N. Musul’bes, a secretary of the Central Committee of CR: 
"Putin is a great President! But… only for capitalists in general, 
and in particular for the oligarchy" (28.05.15) 
-1 
Rodina Party 
V. Fadeev, the chairman of the Saratov regional branch of the 
Party: "I fully support the desire of our national leader President 
Putin to make Russia a great independent country" (26.08.15) 
5 
Civic Platform 
R. Shaikhutdinov, the leader of the Party: "Members of the 
party fully support the policy of President Putin, oppose the 
supporters of he Maidan and approve the accession of Crimea 
(17.04.15) 
5 
Russian Party 
of Pensioners 
for Justice 
Party Resolution: "“Pensioners of Russia” have broken away 
from "A Just Russia" and supported Vladimir Putin" (29.02.12) 
5 
Greens Party 
The Federal Council of the Greens Party adopted a resolution in 
support of the policies of President Putin (24.10.15) 
5 
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Right Cause 
Party 
V. Maratkanov, leader of the Party: "The high rating of the 
president of Russia is natural. It is not the result of short-term 
events " (02.04.15)  
5 
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Table 6. Main Issues of the First Political Cleavage, Summer 2015 
Factor 
score 
Issue UR CPRF JR LDPR Yab PR 
RPR-
PARNAS 
-1.210 
There was a coup in Ukraine in 
February 2014 
5 5 5 5 -5 5 -5 
-1.210 
The Nazis came to power in 
Ukraine 
5 5 5 5 -5 5 -5 
-1.210 
The Ukrainian elite is an 
instrument in the hands of the 
West 
5 5 5 5 -5 5 -5 
-1.210 
It is necessary to support the 
Donetsk and Lugansk ‘people’s 
republics’ 
5 5 5 5 -5 5 -5 
-1.210 
Western sanctions against Russia 
are illegal 
5 5 5 5 -5 5 -5 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
2.026 
Russia annexed Crimea in 
violation of international law 
-5 -5 -5 -5 5 -5 5 
2.026 
The Russian government is 
fighting in eastern Ukraine 
-5 -5 -5 -5 5 -5 5 
2.026 
Putin’s foreign policy is 
adventuristic 
-5 -5 -5 -5 5 -5 5 
2.026 
It is necessary to abolish state 
corporations 
-5 -5 -5 -5 5 -5 5 
2.026 
It is necessary to repeal the law on 
'NGOs - Foreign Agents' 
-5 -5 -5 -5 5 -5 5 
* Party positions in every issue are evaluated using a scale from −5 to +5 (5 – positive attitude, 
-5 – negative attitude, 0 – neutral position or position is absent).  
Key: 
UR – United Russia 
CPRF Party – Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
LDPR – Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
JR – Just Russia 
PR – Patriots of Russia 
Yabl – Yabloko Party 
RPR-PARNAS – Republican Party of Russia – People’s Freedom Party 
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Table 7. Main Issues of the Second Political Cleavage in Summer 2015 
Factor 
score 
Issue UR CPRF JR LDPR Yabl PR 
RPR-
PARNAS 
-1.840 
It is necessary to move the single 
day of voting to a later date 
-5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
-1.840 
Cancelling the municipal filter in 
gubernatorial elections  
-5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
-1.840 
It is necessary to abandon early 
voting 
-5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
-1.840 
It is necessary to stop the 
'optimization' (cuts to) of the 
health care system 
-5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
-1.840 
Real social budget expenditures 
are being reduced 
-5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
1.680 
Attitudes to the reform of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences 
5 -5 -1 4 -5 -2 -4 
1.808 
The legitimacy of destroying 
foods imported from countries 
under counter-sanctions 
5 -5 -2 3 -5 -1 -5 
2.375 
The government anti-crisis plan is 
ineffective 
4 -5 -4 -5 -5 -4 -5 
2.490 
Attitudes towards municipal 
reform 
5 -5 -5 -3 -5 -5 -5 
2.503 
Cancelling the proportional 
system in the Duma elections 
4 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 
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Table 8. Political Cleavages in the 2012-15 Regional Elections 
  Nmb 1st PC 2nd PC 3rd PC 4th PC 5th PC 
2012 
Ossetia 4 AD\SE SE Syst No  
Udmurtia 4 AD\SE SE\Syst Syst AD\Syst  
Krasnodar Krai 4 AD\SE No Syst SE\Syst  
Penza Oblast 3 AD\SE No Syst   
Saratov Oblast 4 AD\SE Syst\SE Syst No  
Sahalin Oblast 4 AD\SE AD\SE\- No SE\syst  
2013 
Bashkortostan 3 AD\SE SE\Syst No   
Buryatia 4 AD\SE SE\Syst Syst No  
Kalmykia 3 AD\SE SE\Syst Syst   
Yukutia 3 AD\SE SE\Syst Syst\AD   
Khakassia 2 AD\SE Syst\AD    
Chechnya 3 AD\SE Syst\AD Syst\SE   
ArkhangelskOblast 4 AD\SE Syst\SE Syst\AD Syst\SE\AD  
VladimirOblast 4 AD\SE Syst\SE Syst\AD No  
IvanovoOblast 5 AD\Syst. SE\Syst Syst\SE No No 
IrkutskOblast 4 AD\Syst. SE\Syst Syst No  
KemerovoOblast 2 AD\SE Syst    
Rostov Oblast 3 AD\SE Syst\SE No   
Smolensk Oblast 3 AD\Syst. Syst\AD Syst\SE   
Ulyanovsk 3 AD\Syst. SE\Syst Syst\AD   
Yaroslavl Oblast 5 AD\Syst. Syst\SE Syst\AD No No 
Trans-Baikal Krai 3 AD\Syst. Syst\SE No   
2014 
Republic of Altai 3 S(U) AD\Syst SE\Syst   
Kabardino-Balkaria 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Karachay-Cherkessia 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Mari El 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Tatarstan 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Tuva 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Khabarovsk Krai 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Briansk Oblast 3 S(U) AD\Syst SE\Syst   
Volgograd Oblast 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Tula Oblast 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Crimea 3 S(U) SE\Syst Syst\AD   
Sevastopol 2 S(U) SE\Syst    
NenetsAD 3 S(U) Syst\AD SE\Syst   
2015 
Komi Republic 2 S(U) Syst\AD    
BelgorodOblast 2 S(U) AD\SE    
Voronezh Oblast 2 S(U) AD\SE    
Kaluga Oblast 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Kostroma Oblast 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Kurgan Oblast 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
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Magadan Oblast 2(<) S(U) AD\Syst    
Novosibirsk Oblast 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Ryazan Oblast 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Chelyabinsk Oblast 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Yamal-Nenets AD 2 S(U) AD\Syst    
Key: 
Nmb – Number of political cleavages in a region 
PC – Political cleavage 
AD – Authoritarian-Democratic political cleavage 
SE – Socio-economic political cleavage 
Syst – Systemic political cleavage 
No – A cleavage has no interpretation 
S(U) – Systemic (Ukraine) political cleavage 
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Table 9. Political and Social Interpretation of Electoral Cleavages in the 2012-15 
Regional Elections 
  
Nmb 
1st EC 2nd EC 3rd EC 4th EC 5th EC 6th EC 
PI SI PI SI PI SI PI SI PI SI   
2012 
Ossetia 5 No Urb No No No No AD No Syst No   
Udmurtia 2 AD Urb SE DC         
Krasnodar Krai 2 AD No SE Urb         
Penza Oblast 2 AD 
Urb, 
WB 
SE DC, EA       
  
Saratov Oblast 3 AD No No 
Urb, DC, 
EA 
No No     
  
Sakhalin Oblast 3 AD DC No EA, WB No Urb       
2013 
Bashkortostan 2 AD 
Urb, 
Wb 
SE DC, EA         
Buryatia 3 AD 
Urb, 
Wb 
SE DC, EA No No       
Kalmykia 3 
AD, 
Syst 
DC No WB No No       
Yukutia 3 AD WB SE DC, EA No 
Urb, 
EA 
      
Khakassia 3 No 
Urb, 
EA 
No DC AD DC       
Chechnya 2 AD EA No 
DC, 
WB 
        
Arkhangelsk 
Oblast 
4 No 
Urb, 
DC 
No No No No SE EA     
Vladimir Oblast 6 AD 
Urb, 
EA 
No DC No 
Urb, 
EA 
No No No WB Syst No 
IvanovoOblast 4 AD 
Urb, 
EA 
No Urb No DC SE 
Urb, 
WB 
    
IrkutskOblast 5 AD 
Urb, 
DC, 
EA 
SE DC, EA No No No DC No    
KemerovoOblast 2 AD Urb No Urb         
Rostov Oblast 2 AD No SE 
Urb, 
DC, EA 
        
Smolensk Oblast 4 AD 
Urb, 
DC 
Syst No SE DC       
Ulyanovsk 3 AD 
Urb, 
DC, 
EA 
SE No No EA       
Yaroslavl Oblast 4 No 
Urb, 
EA 
No DC, EA No No No No     
Trans-Baikal Krai 
3 AD 
Urb, 
WB 
SE 
Urb, 
WB 
No No       
2014 
Republic of Altai 5 No 
Urb, 
DC 
No No AD DC 
AD, 
SE 
No No No 
  
Kabardino-
Balkaria 
3 AD No No 
Urb, 
EA 
No No     
  
Karachay-
Cherkessia 
2 
AD, 
S(U) 
No AD No       
  
Mari El 2 
S(U), 
AD 
Urb, 
EA 
No DC       
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Tatarstan 1 
S(U), 
AD 
Urb, 
DC, 
EA 
        
  
Tuva 3 AD 
Urb, 
EA 
S(U) 
Urb, 
DC 
AD EA     
  
Khabarovsk Krai 4 AD 
Urb, 
DC, 
WB 
No WB No 
EA, 
WB 
No No   
  
Briansk Oblast 3 AD No 
S(U), 
SE 
Urb, 
EA 
No No     
  
Volgograd Oblast 3 AD Urb S(U) Urb No 
Urb, 
DC 
    
  
Tula Oblast 3 AD EA S(U) Urb S(U) WB       
Crimea 4 AD - No - AD - No      
Sevastopol 2 No - No -         
NenetsAD 2 AD - No          
2015 
Komi Republic 2 AD EA No DC         
Belgorod Oblast 
2 
S(U), 
AD 
DC, 
EA 
AD DC   
      
Voronezh Oblast 1 AD Urb           
Kaluga Oblast 
3 
AD 
Urb, 
DC, 
WB 
No DC   
      
Kostroma Oblast 
3 
S(U), 
AD 
DC No EA   
      
Kurgan Oblast 
2 
S(U), 
AD 
No No No   
      
Magadan Oblast 
3 
AD, 
S(U) 
No S(U) No No WB 
      
Novosibirsk 
Oblast 3 
AD EA No Urb No Urb 
      
Ryazan Oblast 2 AD Urb No EA         
Chelyabinsk 
Oblast 2 
AD 
DC, 
EA 
No No   
      
Yamal-Nenets AD 
2 
S(U), 
AD 
No AD No   
      
Key: 
Nmb – Number of electoral cleavages in a region 
EC – Political cleavage 
PI – Political interpretation 
SI – Social interpretation 
AD – strong (R>0.5) correlation with the authoritarian-democratic political cleavage 
SE – strong (R>0.5) correlation with the socioeconomic political cleavage 
Syst – strong (R>0.5) correlation with the systemic political cleavage 
S (U) – strong (R>0.5) correlation with the systemic (Ukraine) political cleavage 
Urb – the level of the urbanization as a predictor of a cleavage 
DC – demographic characteristics as a predictor of a cleavage 
EA – the level of the economic activity as a predictor of a cleavage 
WB – the level of well-being as a predictor of a cleavage 
No – A cleavage has no interpretation 
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Chart 1. Factor Loadings of Parties in the Third Political Cleavage in Summer 2015 
Key: 
UR – United Russia 
CPRF Party – Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
LDPR – Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
JR – Just Russia 
PR – Patriots of Russia 
Yabl – Yabloko Party 
RPR-PARNAS – Republican Party of Russia – People’s Freedom Party 
CR – Communist of Russia 
Rodina – Rodina Party 
CP – Civic Platform 
RPPfJ – Russian Party of Pensioners for Justice 
Greens – Russian Ecological Party 'Green" 
RC – Right Cause Party 
CPSS – Communist Party of Social Justice 
PfJ – Party for Justice 
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